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Abstrrk:
Dengan sermkin ketatnlp perwingan bisno perusahaan-pruebaan dituntut untuk menjadiyry?.yn efrsien agarsefidaklYa daoat nnmpeftahankan ketangsurryai niatpnya, tebih baiklagiiika perusahaan'perusahaan tersebut dipat menBdi wngletb;ix di industrtnlp nasing-
masing. Oleh Rarenanlf'a', seltap perusf/l:E,an'neruftrlfE nrr,n(r|ri alat, sfarrXa r atau |x,chnr|iKyang wsuai &ngan kodisi peruahaannlp dan kenadian rrcrnAf1$nr* di semiabidang, termasuk Reuangan. fulah srrtu aht-bantu di bidang keuangan yang sedang hangatdibicankan dalah Ecoiomic Value Adcrld (EvA), w,rg funjacti boxix 6n"r"n artiket dibawah ini.
Introduction
There is a belief, especially in caqitalis! coqntries, that the fundarnental goal of allbusinesses is to maximize ihareh6uer vilue. Failure to oo so may result in pressure fromthe board of directors, activist shareholders, o.r 
",ren " 
hostite takeowr. However, incountries sucfi as Japan and in Europe.more 1ve[hts are giren to the intereJts of customers,suppliers, uorkers, the grovernment, ceflnro{eE, equity hotdere and even society at large.They belierre that maximizing sharehoH6r value is dhoitsighted, inefficient, simplistic andantisocial. They prove their point of view with the higl,l standard of living and rapid 6conomicgroYwr in Euope and Japan, and to the success of Japanese auto and onsumer eloctronicscompanies
On the @ntrary, a Ullstyle system based on maximizing stureholder \rafue,accompanied by broad onnership of 
.d"qland equity and an op"nh"*"t for oorporatecontrol, appears to be closely linked yll q high.;r it"na"tc'or riving,-great€r orrerallproductivity and competitiwneis, and a better Lrndiiiini equity market lt leads 1o fiE factthat sharehoHer urealth creaion does not come at tr; expense of other stakeholders.Wnning companies, Tto.n compared q $eJr *rnp"titoo; haG;;"d;i, i.j"*",tv, greaterincreases in shareholdels tflealtr, ancl hlghei;"fi;ft;nt, wtriih creaie retatinety greatervatue for customers, suppriers or capital,. ?69.r "nd?i;d;;#ii'tilJtilr= pard).As capital markets continue to globalize, 
""pGio*omes ewr mong mobile. Thus, ifaountries whose economic systems aie not basei or, r"rimizitg Cr,ar"rroner rnalue gireinvesbrs lorrrer retums on caiitalthan ttpse urtro oo,-t*ner or later they wiff be left and bestarved for capital. 
.ThA the ne{ question wiil bel vi,r;ais me best measure to assess thevafue of afl companies? ' ,
In general, th€re are twg major qluatign apploaches that compete with eactr other:1. fn the amuntirp apprwch, ail trat mattep ire ne aqcgunting eamirgs of the firm.value is simprv eamings times some,m.ultipniG pri"*omings or p/E ratio).2' fn the discountd asi flav approacrr, rre wrue;ffi"n is the future epected cash flovrrdiscounted at a rate fiat refl#s the riskiness orG-cash flow'
IN THE QUEST TO CREATE SHAREHOLDERS'WEALTH
' Doeen taap di j'rusan Man4iemen universitas lbtolik paratryangan, Band,ng.
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Accounting Approach
In practice, !9r ve-ars Eaming Per Share (EPs) has been used as the most reliableinformation in revealing firms' perfoimance. usei ranges rrom x,re inrio"*, i.e. all kinds ofmanagens wfto depend their annual bonuses on this-measurement, to outsiders, such asinveslors, a1nlvst1, and money managers who wants to maximize their investment. lnaddition to EPS, they also use other measurerents sucfr as sales grorlh, market share,eamings, retum on equity, free cash-..flow, operating margin, retirrn on ass€ts, plantutifization, etc', wftich often create conflicting or;j""tt"i ano lnioiguour ierrormance. rorexample, when top.man?gers emphasizes oi ure nrm's grorlrh on ira*et ;63-19:'6.;;;;less on the cost to build it, whicfi may reduce the value of trre firm itsetf. Moreo*r, althoughuseful' these measures can mislead.-.For in$ance, i nlgilrv |everaggd*rnpnv can post aninflated RoE' Accounting poticies and eamingr rinrg;r"nt can distort Eps. positive RoAcan hide retum below the cost of capitaf. Y'v'v'r b' 'l
Accounting eamings rarely rdflects the value of a firm since eamings per share orretum on equity are uzually used in a myopic w3y * requiring information 
"oout 
only the nextfew years at best. Fufhemlqrg,_ eamings tenoC to idus mainty on managing the incomestiatement and places tow wbigrrt on thJadual 
"rount "nd 
timing of cash flows. Even thespread betucen the retum ron inrested.capitat (R di and the coit or *pit"r can be a badmetric if used only for the short term and b6cause it encourages underinvestment (harvestingthe business to increlse Rolc). These performance r"arrr"s are not comprehensire andare not well conelated with the actual markEt rnalue of companies.Therefore, accounting eamings is useful ror rnaruatibn olly when eamings is a good
Prory for ille elpe$eq bng term cain flor,v of the rinn ruot all firms g"nerqte the same cashflow for each rupiah of eamings, honever, so earnings approafies are ge4eralfy onfy usefulfor very rough value approximltion.
Discounted Cash Flow Approach (DCF approach)
In this approacfi, the value or a mm. eedadthg-present value of its expgsted cashflows disounted al.qn appropriate discount ra'te. ocr ipproacn is befter than accountingapproacfi because it is the only measure that requirei complete information. To understandvalue creation on" TY?l u:e.a tong term point 6f viar, manage alf cash flonr on both theincome statement and the oalanceineet, and understand how to compare cash flow fromdifferent.time periods on.a-.risk-adjusted basis. Howerer, many practitioners becomeconfused in defining the cash flow or determining the proper discount rate.Among many ditre.rent DCF approaches,-trere aie h,rc outstanding approaches thatthey are straighffonrard to use and hiylorcvide insighti into the underlying eoonomics of thefirm being rnafued' They are the entity ridr mooeiini tn '"*nomic profit modet.
Entitv DCF model
The entity DCF model vatues tl9 pqytty.of a company as the rnalue of a company,soperations (the entity mtue that is available to irr in*ri-*r) less the value of debt and otherinvestor cfaims that are superior to common equity (such as prefened stock). This model isespecially useful when efiended to a multibusineiint. rn" equity nalue 6r rre corporateeguals the sum of the raalues of the inctividual op"ritinf units, ptus cash-genenating corporateassets' less the cost of operating the corporate centei and *re value of the corlporate,s debtand preferred stock.
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Ecgnomic profit modg!
In the economic profit model, the value S a firm equals the amount of capital inrcstedplus a premium equalto the present value of the value cieeteC each year goind fonrard. An
advantage of the ?lnoTic profit motlel orrer the entity DCF modet is-thd ionomic profit isa useftrl measure for understanding a firm's pertormance in any sirptsyeai while free cashflow is not tt because frbe cash fbw in aly.y:qqr is determined-bi nbirv discretionaryinvestrnents in fixed assets and raorking capital. fherefore, management codld easily cefaiinvestnents simply to improrae tree caJh flow. in a. giren year atine erpense of tongtel#
value creation. Economic profit_is also called residial income or.Economic value Added
FVAi, s'hich is a trademait ot Stem Ste'r/art & C;.-|";d"r to arnid iny co,nnrsion betrrrreenthese tenns and forconrrenience, EVA will be used hereafter.
-, 
Afthough FORTUNE'magazine called the EVA as "today's hottest financial idea andgeting hottef wfiile Shm Steuart & Co. popularize it in its conzulti,rrg praciice, the conceptitself dates back to the economist Atfted fudnhalt wfio wrote in 1890: "Vl/hat rernains of his(the omer or manegefs) profits after deduc{ing intere+ on nis capfli"t in"L""rn rate maybe called his eamings of undertiaking or.management" lt'means grat tne rnatue creat€d by afirm during any time period must take into'a6count rrct onty tne ;rp;;; recorded in i,tsaccounting records but also the opportunity ost of the capitaiempnyiO ilx1" business.
Sharehotder Wealth
Firms compete with eactr other to becorne the winning.firm by impbmentir€ manymanagement tools- Hote\,er, since most d tfiem do not hive an int 
'fi"teo syitem orcorporate management, most of tre time those objec{iyes become amUigudi, and confliciedwith each olher. For instiane, a finir may use oi'scounteo r".n ao*-iii."pit"l budgsting;eaTtlg? brsetting goals,"communication wffr investors, and performan"" measurement;and htdgets for bonuseg. As predic{ed in the classic stuOy of Berle and Means, the mostdestructire result from this conflict is that top managerc 
"s 
tire trusted ageniC or the orner of$9 firms' neglect their main luty to maximize trd sharenqHer,wealth, and may be moleinterested in their peBonal nrelfare, such as their ereririreseo bonus and satary.On thE conq.ry, basic Prporate finance and microeconomic theory tett" u, fiat theprime financial directirre of any firin ought tg be to maximize the vrrealth of its sharchoHers.This obiectiw also sen/es as a rule in-manfuing and arrocating ;; i"rour* efficienly,which in turn benefit society at targe.
However, maximizing the shareholders' y_ealth is rpt the same as maximizing thefirm's total mar*et rnalue. A ffnn,s total value qould Oe mardmizeO simpfi Uyln*rting as mucflcapital in it as possible' orr the contrary, Ctrarenoioers we.arm 
"ari 
irnrv |e-maximized bymaximizing the difference between the frm's 
.ma*et Jpitfaation 
"nO 
tHtoar capitat thatinrresbrs haw commitled to it. The difierence is carreo rvrl*et Vatue fu'd"d- (iivn):
Jnarket capitalization is the market raalre of equig and debt.inw.st{ capitat is a firm's btaf book qeot ano-oook 
"diy capitaf base incfudingretained eafings and equrty'-equivabnt reserv.es, s'u"tr as capitalizecl R&De)pensgs.
BINA EKONOMI / Agustus / Iggg
29
MVA reflects market's belief of the firm's future retums either above or belor its cost
;ffiijnil^e MVA concept implicitly assumes the stock market's efficiency as a discounting
The next question will be; what kind of measure that best rcpresent tris MVA? Basedon the research of Stem Stenrart & co. tor tirmJinrrrc"o in Sfem Sfewad furtormance1@0, the cfranges in these firms' EVAs oyer a firre-year period account for nearty s0% of thechanges in their MVAs recorded over that samq time. ay comparison,'-grrrtn in saleserpfained lavo al rc-Yyl .rtanges,.growlfr in eaminJs per share just 15% to 20g0, and
Ftu.m $r eeuitv only 357o. Thus, evR iJtne best. Trre;;;on \,vhy EVA is not more than 500/ois simpfy.because stock prices are fonrard-fooking, thui creating a fundamental mismatcfrbetween fre time perspeaive of EVA and MvA. rt rieaniinat a firm's stock price at any pointin time is halfdetermined by the EVA over the first fine years and half-determined by theexpected EVA for all future years after that
Economic Value Added {EVA)
Arithmetically EVA equals h" T.tJ3x operating profils,minus the appropriate capitalcharge for both debl-and equrty (usually it is ariproxim-aieo using weighted average cost ofcapital 
- 
wAcc)' wtrat remains is the'dott"t irount'oi nni.n profits in any given periodexceed or fall short of the cost of all capital used to proiuce those profits. This issue is thegreatest difference between EVA and other financial m""rrr"rent, since almost all otherfinancial measurements only look at rre eamings i"pJrt"o in the'amunting or financialstatements, which often misiead. \i/hat looks like-a prJni in tne accounting report may be aloss since it has not ounted the cost to the straretritoers yet. As peter oiro<er put it in his1995 Harvard Br.rsiness Review article: "EVA is oasec-on something vye hare known for along time: $/hat we call profits, he money left to r"ri"" equity, is usually not profit at all.until a business retums a profit that is greater than its oost of capitaf, it operates at a foss.
llever mind h-at it pays taies as if it nai a genrine piont. The enterprise stiil returns tess tothe economy than it derours in resources... untit thin it does not create wealth; it destroysit'" Hence'.trr.re pro'fits d9 qot begin until the ;a,"i."pit l, like alf other @sts, has beencovered. Thus, the formula fior EVA is:
EVA=NOPAT-C%OC)
where NOPAT is net operating profit aftertaxes
C% is the percentage ost of capital, which is usually approximated using the tareightedav-erage cost of capital WACC)TC is totatcapital.
From the above brmula decision-makers should know ffrat fiere are three ruays toincrease EVA' First, they may increase trJemciencv oJitl ru either resulting in increasingNoPAT witho,t using more capital or o.ecreaselldtrai,tr. second, they may be use lesscapitaf (i'e' decreasing.the codt or lfnitat anc rci. Tttid, they ma/ inGsi'Lpitat in high-retum proiects (i'e. uctt above rre Rrin's 
"osi 
oi6"pit"rl or withdraw from projects givingretums below the cost of capital.
To put it more-simply, EVA is an estimate, horerer simple or precise, of a business,strue economic profit. EVA ttius differs from accounting profit:
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1. EVA is the residual irrcome remaining der subtrac{ing the cost of alt the capital that has
been employed to ptoduce the operating profit lt thus integrates operating effciency and
balance shoet management in orre rileasur€ acceesbte to operating people.2. EV{ is charged for capitrat at a rate that compensates inrestors-for bearing the firm,s
erplicit business risk.3. EVA adjusts reported accounting results to eliminate distortions encountered in
measuring true eonomic performance.
As mentioned aborre, EVA can_be simpte or precise, depending on how many
adjustments a firm ie willing to make. Presently, Stem Stewart &'Co. his identified 1O4
adjustment issues, hourercr, in adding one more adiustment eacfi firm should consftler the
cost and benefit of more precise m€asuro it giros. in general, a firm only uses fiw to ten
adjustments depending on its nature of h.rsineis
Overall, EVA is'a financial managffnent system, i.e. the set of financial policies andprocedures, and measures and methods, wtticfr guide and control a firm's opdrafions and
strategy. lhe tinancial malag.em€n! system concems such things as setting and
communicating financial goals, both intemally and eldematfy;'evatuaftng Uotr strdrt-termprofit plans and longrtenn strategic plans;,auocatlng rusources, irom Oec*oifo where to but ;
new piee of equipment b aceuiring.arrd.dirres[ing entire companies; erraluatng openatingperbrmance fiom a ftnancial perspective and Sacing Ure sourco; of thai perfiormanoe back top9 straogh and openating lerrers arailable o mardgens. Therebre, theierm evA nas cometo bs used as strorthand.forany system of orponatimenag€ment that defines prolitability tnt€rms.of return on capital and aims speciRcitty at oo&tiirg the retum 
"Oo* x1e cost ofcapital.
EVA and Incentive Compeneation Syetem
Since EVA is usd as the enterplece of a completely integrated frameuork for
Ijlt$cial mryragemsril that are anchored uy t'r" incentiro conpensation plan, G 
"dil;';;EVA ca1 rxlt be raactxxl if the firm'itseli does not integnatb it uritr firm's compensation
fYstery. Intagrating EVA wifrt the firm's cgmqgnsatim system wiu resutt in *ranginib"d;;
througth.out the,firm. 
-m,-th" @ntrary, if all a-firm intendi to do is measure gvn ano use ir asons more bencfimark of performance, it probably is not rrrnrth the b6ther, Oecauselt;lt *ltbe an interesting information, no mor€ anO no teis.
There is no doubt that alt of the managers haw an intense desire to sucoeed andsometnr they harre the.capabifity to succeed.-Therefore, the centrat question faed Oy atttop managers ard board of dirEctors is hor.p.deralop and direct tros; managers in waysthat maximize the $rccess qf botr the indivirtual anA tr" ;nt"tpri"L. -rn" answer lies inhuman naUre: peoote do.wtrat you rarard.m"* fu doirp, not wtiat you e*roJ-d6;ft;:The secondary goals and incentives sent.down by the 
"ieortiws may get Jit" "t"iiiii",but a manager or ugfkg/s real energy will be fodsed on tr" variabfe that drirres his or herbonus or is most likely to lead to i promotion. Thus, if the 
"i"o.,ti*r p"y p*pte forgenerating mors EVA, they will get nrore EVA and, with it, e higher strare price a'nd lreater{|r$otoer weath- tn adcition urere wilt be a mdre iuco"sstut organizatbn that providesgreder non-monetary satisfaciion as well.
In order to acfriew this obiective, rrone ard npre firms use EVA because EVA differs .tl 
_t e,. ways fro11 the mnwntiqrat incentir,e *re"nr"$on sysie, il"orrended byconzulting firms. First, EVi bonus plan does not haG any c€lps, the more EVA increases,the bigger the bonus-withod fimG. lt can be otrered 6ecdu# ne firm pays only forsustainable increases in EVA, ard a portiol.of-any exceptional bonus awaru groes into a
'bonus bank" for payment in future yeais, and is rorr6iteo n'ivniuoilfilil fals. lt is quite
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common in practice that when bonus plans are based on improvements in EVA as opposedto absolub EVA, the ftnn typically holis hostage as much as two thirds of declared bonusestied to EVA' And managefti wifl lose this two tnlnCs if they do not at least maintain the level ofperfiormance that caused the declaration of the bonus iri ttre first place. The consequence ofthis bonus bank feature is to len9then the managerial decision-making norizon beyond oneyear' For a sucoess'li.rl manager under this plan, eacfi new year brings steadily increasin!payouts, new declarations, and new hold-backs. Under this system,-" r"nager receilesaround 90o/o of his bonus within six years. The most significant resuft of niJ "uncap bonus" isthat it gives manaqers a pecuniiry reason to continue striving for better and betterperformance even in. boom years. In addition, the "bonus baik" guards against the
lemptation !o gaTe. the system by sacrificing the future for short-terfr gain. These twofeatures in the end shape the managers tp act like an owner.
. . 
Seondly, the targets for EVR improvement under the bonus plan are automatically
reset by formula instead of negotiating a budgeted fevel of improvement each year. Hence,managers under a1.EvA bonus plan..are encouraged to iropose agjmsi,irr€ budgetsbecause they will not be penalized f6r falling short. on itre othei ndno, tnJiiriu get pald extrafor ewrything they do acfrieve.
EVA and Long Term percpective of the Firm
One of EV4': major advrantages differentiating it significanily from other financialmeasures is that EVA. $9 a fong-term perspeciive ri'ew. tiis not .inrv-"nalyzed a firm,shistoricalperformance but in orderio assess the real rnalue of the firm it needs to forecast thefuture value of that firm. Time must be considered because the firm's key value drivers,growth and retum on invested capital, are not constant or,ertime.
Doing so, firms must erraluate their strategic position, considering both the industrycharacferistics and their competiti\€ advantageJ oi oisaorrantages. This will help firmsassess their grwvth potential and their ability to 6am retums above*reir cost of capitaf.Competitive advantages that transla-te into a poiitine spread of ROIC and WACC canbe categorized into three types:
' 
P.Pydirq superior ralue to the customer through a combination of price and productattributes that can not be repticated by competitoE.r Achieving lower costs than competitors.
i . U.,{li.zine_capital more productively than competitiors.ldent'fying firm's competitive advantage,..one may use customer segmentation analysis,competitive business system analysis, ind industry itructure analysis.Once the firm knows its c6mpetitive 
"O*,it te "nO no*, io achiere and sustain it, itshould derefop performance scenarios. Doing 116, uie-fi; is aware that foreGsting financialperbrmane is at best an educated guess. The best the firm can do is nanow down therange of likely future performance
Summary
Among so many financial meastrres a{ orporate standards and benchmarfts,recenfly EVA stands out from the crowd. More and ro16 nr"lt known oest companies in theirown industries, as direrse as AT&T, Coca.cola, Siemens, and Menill Lynch implement it intheir system' Eren bu.siness- magazine such as Fortune called it a; ,d;t{ nottest financialidea and gefting hofter'. 
.Afthough basicatly EVA i; a financiar meeisrie of corporateperformance, the features it has d'ifferentiate it with oth; significantty. lts main differencewith others is that it charges profit for the cost or all inecapiEt a firm employs. The capitatcharge in EVA is wfiat economists callan opportunity cost.
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. 
AddiEonalry, EV.A heFe manqBrq b pay atbntirn on the lmglbrm porspodiw of thefirm, I'Hte, EvA iB rlct orily ue€fr{ in-thc fthid a3pectd$e nrmlil rrsi,oiler 
"iar tlatit inoorportr frm'3 sfrdegic dstning as n€[ h ord* fo se lroil| tilms can siliro b bo Uiebest it can be. HortBll9r, to siraoeed-EVA strould bc hUgrdod widr tre firm,s ompensation
system.
As the tus|dt, E\lA $ves rnffagsts qf,e br lrfunrdion and urpedor mohlal*m b
make decisions il|st wlll creatE tre greatect iharoholder wsalth in any publidy o,r'rled orprivate enbrpdse.
tslbflognphy
-, 
s|.unrter 1992. Sbm Silrert Round Table On Msrag€rnent Incentive Compensation
and thatehoEervsfu€'; .ranmal dAppH corpordg FFrance.
;, Afgu-*tf, rsz.'vatring donrpnbs, istarosfi iy?, rrre economist.c"P"hq'f,, l(oflerI. dtd tltunin J., 1$i6. v*tdd: t6esuring;nd'd;n4ing tre vahre
of Corpanhs", Nerr yoR: Jotrn \Mey & Sms. f Antim. -Ehrbs, A., 1998. T" ry"d Key b Creafiri Wedtr',-Jofin l/lrfley & Sons, An Eterg ftonrhttp:/Armyv.stemstewart.com/ - w'.- 'r
Hard, G., June 23, IgnT. fiofl Kflbrs Coutf, @Hanrel, G, .hne 23, 19e7. 'Kifler gffiEin* ualte Srrareholders Ridr',http :/Aryww.fortune. com/
Hame!,. G. 
..and Ehrk, A.,. Auguct 4, 1ggz. "Dobs: tuking ft ort owr ffA,,W:Ituv,n.lbrtmo.com/
Milunovftfi, S. ?nq,I3g, A., Sprirq i90A .EVA h tp Computer Indusfrf, Jornat ofApdbd Corporae Finane.
9tem *ralt Srrrrmer ls.t. 'HlA Rordhblct, Jilnd dApplbd Comorae Finane.St*art_ftf, 8., Suruner 1g&f. "EVA: raa anb rifrsy',, firn", ;F nidiii6r.oFinanca.
Tsitdbawn, R., Noveinber lo, 1gg7. ?marica's Grcslost wellh crffi,http : lAlnmr.fortune. com/
Topkis, M., Decer&erg, lgg0. ? i.ler,Wayto Find Brrgsiffi,, @vllhs€len, T- L. and Htngpr, J, D., 1995. i$qoq1Mffie**t im eusiness pc[igf. Ne*Yotlc Atldiqo*Westey tubtishiE Co, inclSF eeit6.
Inputardmatedarlstrwnnrur*/n.rnvnv.stemstewqrt.cornTl
BINA EKONOIdI tAsusas / Iggs
